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“Subverting the Settled Order of Things”: 
Sedition and Crimes against the State 
 
 
I. The Rise and Fall of Sedition 
In the introduction to Leviathan, where he developed an extended metaphor 
comparing parts of Leviathan, or the artificial man, to the human body, Thomas 
Hobbes described sedition as sickness, a sign of ill health in the body politic.1 This 
understanding of sedition, between concord and civil war, indicates the seriousness of 
the threat which sedition was understood to pose to the ongoing life and healthy 
functioning of the state. The criminal law, as a system of rewards and punishments, 
was described as the ‘nerves’ of the Leviathan by which means men were moved to 
perform their duty, and so it is not surprising to find that sedition – as a form of 
treason or as a description of other kinds of conduct (conspiracy, libel, speech) 
directed against established authority – figured large in early modern systems of 
criminal law. This might be contrasted with a modern understanding of the 
importance of dissent or disagreement to a properly functioning political order, and 
the modern distrust of political and legal orders where dissent is stifled. In these 
orders the crime of sedition has either been abolished or, if it remains in the law, plays 
a greatly restricted role. This, in many ways, is a remarkable transformation, central 
not only to the development of modern ideas and forms of politics, but also the 
changing function of the criminal law. 
 
                                                 




In this paper I discuss a number of legal issues around the definition and use of the 
crime of sedition and related offences. I am interested in particular in the way that the 
legal definition has developed or changed over the period from the eighteenth century 
to the present day. This is the period in which the modern crime of sedition emerged, 
but almost as rapidly fell into disrepute. There were sporadic prosecutions for the 
crime in many common law jurisdictions over the course of the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-centuries, but in many jurisdictions the crime has now been either abolished 
or substantially reformed. The story of this development is reasonably well known, 
but I want also to relate it to a broader set of questions about how the scope and nature 
of class of crimes against the state or political crimes changed over this period.2 The 
criminal law has been, and continues to be involved in the criminalisation of various 
forms of dissent and political protest. It is also clear that the legal forms in which this 
criminalisation takes place change over time, partly in response to new kinds of 
protest and political emergencies and partly in response to changing tactics in the 
policing and prosecution of dissent. The question I want to address is what an analysis 
of these changing forms of criminalisation of political speech can tell us about the 
changing nature of the criminal law.3 The issues that I want to focus on here concern 
the changing conceptions of the relationship between thought, conduct and 
responsibility, and second how the idea of the state or the political was conceptualised 
in the criminal law as the object of this type of crime.  
 
                                                 
2 See generally M Lobban, “From Seditious Libel to Unlawful Assembly: Peterloo and the Changing 
Face of Political Crime c1770-1820” (1990) 10 Oxford Jnl of Leg. Stud. 307-52; M. Head, Crimes 
Against the State (Ashgate 2010); KJM Smith, “Securing the State, the Institutions of Government and 
Maintaining Political Order” in Cornish et al, The Oxford History of the Laws of England (Oxford 
2010). 
3 Note that I am aware that ‘political crimes’ are not necessarily the only way of dealing with political 
protest; and that political protest does not always manifest itself  in a form which will be identified by 




The crime of sedition is an ideal case study for this exercise. It is an old crime, related 
at one extreme to the crime of treason, and at the other to lesser but distinct forms of 
‘word’ crime such as blasphemy.4 However, it came to prominence with the 
emergence of modern forms of politics: in the words of Henry Cockburn, sedition is 
crime “of a somewhat orderly age”, its very existence presupposing some form of 
political liberty, and an underlying, if unexamined, conception of order.5 In its origins 
the boundaries of the crime of sedition were unproblematic: treason, sedition and 
blasphemy were all part of the arsenal of crimes that were used to police political and 
religious allegiance.6 Crimes against religion and the state were virtually 
indistinguishable either in terms of the threat that they were understood to pose to 
established order, their mode of commission, or in their justification. They were 
primarily focused on conduct, but the word was understood in most cases as a deed, 
and prosecution for certain kinds of speech or publication was accordingly 
unproblematic.7 Problems arose in the modern period in part because of the 
emergence of new spaces and forms of politics, but also because of a pulling apart of 
word and deed in the conception of the crime. The change came about as the 
authorities fell back on the crime of sedition as a means of suppressing dissent and 
political unrest in the immediate wake of the French revolution. But its use in this 
context required a broadening of the definition of the crime. Seditious language could 
no longer be understood in absolute terms as an attack on the state, but in terms of its 
                                                 
4 This term is from J. Marsh, Word Crimes. Blasphemy, Culture, and Literature in Nineteenth-Century 
England (Chicago, 1998). For discussion of the history of the term ‘sedition’ see C. Kyer, “Sedition 
Through the Ages: A Note on Legal Terminology” (1979) 37 U Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 266. 
5 H. Cockburn, An Examination of the Trials for Sedition (1888) 
6 See e.g. W. Blackstone, Commentaries vol.4 chs.4 & 6-9 on crimes against religion and against the 
state. Interestingly, writing in 1765 he does not even distinguish sedition/seditious libel as a distinct 
crime. 
7 See Blackstone who acknowledges that treason requires an overt act as evidence of intent, but goes on 
to state that writing words out could constitute the deliberate act of treason p.80. Discussed in Stern, 




tendency to lead to further action which might undermine the state. The same was true 
of other crimes such as blasphemy, which was understood not in terms of insult to a 
supreme god but as a crime which “tended to weaken and undermine the very 
foundation on which all human laws must rest” thereby encouraging acts of outrage 
and violence.”8 These changes made possible the conviction of prominent radicals 
such as Thomas Paine and Thomas Muir, but in doing so created problems for the 
future use of the crime. 
 
In this paper I am primarily looking at the crime of sedition and its use in Scotland. 
The history of the law of sedition in Scotland is significant because the crime was in 
practical terms created in the trials of the 1790s, meaning that there is more overt 
discussion of the definition and function of the crime. There are slight differences 
here from the crime in English law and the law of other common law influenced 
jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia – notably that there was a single crime of 
sedition, rather than the different forms of seditious libel and conspiracy. However, 
the general patterns of development and use are similar between these jurisdictions 
and I shall refer to a range of jurisdictions in the latter part of the discussion. I will 
first of all give a general overview of the use of the c rime of sedition in Scotland, 
before going on to look at more specific issues relating to the development of the 
crime. I will then conclude with a discussion of some more general points about the 
structure of the law of sedition and the place of political offences within criminal law.  
 
 
II. The Scottish Sedition Trials of 1793-4 
                                                 




When James Tytler was charged with the crime of sedition before the High Court of 
Justiciary in Edinburgh in January 1793 this was the first time that anyone had been 
charged directly with the crime of sedition in Scots law.9 While there had been earlier 
trials where the word sedition had been used in the charge, this had usually been to 
describe conduct that was linked to an allegation of some form of treason. Equally, 
there were a number of statutes of the Scottish Parliament that had used the term, but 
it was not clear from these that sedition was understood to be a distinct offence. This 
trial, though, was to be the first of thirteen sedition trials that took place between in 
the period January 1793 and March 1794 which completely transformed the 
understanding of political crimes in Scots law.10 
 
The cases in this period fall into three main groups. The first six cases between 
January and March 1793 were of prosecutions against printers and booksellers for 
forms of seditious speech or for the publishing or circulation of forms of seditious 
writing.11 These led to convictions in every case where the accused appeared for trial, 
but seem to have been regarded as relatively minor instances, attracting short 
custodial sentences or requiring sureties for future good behaviour.12 There was a 
qualitative change, though, with the trial of Thomas Muir in August 1793. Muir was a 
                                                 
9 An important feature of the Scottish trials was that they all took place before the High Court – this is 
an important difference from England where seditious libel was misdemeanour and could be tried 
before lower courts. This is probably because the Crown was relying on a residual common law power 
to create or recognise new crimes as authority for the court’s actions. 
10 All the Scottish sedition trials for this period can be found in T.B. Howell, A Complete Collection of 
State Trials (vol XXIII) (London: Hansard, 1817) Cockburn, Examination,  supra n.5 draws on 
Howell’s edition and provides an overview of all the sedition trials in Scotland between 1793 and 1848 
with extensive and opinionated commentary. 
11 In one case against the publisher and printer of a newspaper, the Edinburgh Gazzetteer,  for a report 
of a sedition trial that was alleged to have caricatured the judge: Captain Johnson & Simon Drummond 
Jan & Feb 1793 (Cockburn, Examination, pp.118-27. 
12 Those who did not appear for trial were outlawed, but it appears that no further or more strenuous 
efforts were made to prosecute. See e.g. the discussion of Tytler, Elder & Stewart, Alexander Scott in 
Cockburn. This is consistent with the practice in England described in C. Emsley, “An aspect of Pitt’s 




young advocate who was a founder member of the Scottish Society of the Friends of 
the People advocating parliamentary reform and extension of the franchise. He had 
attended a series of meetings at which he had made speeches and read from Thomas 
Paine’s The Rights of Man – a work which had shortly before this been found to be 
seditious in the trial in absentia of Paine in London in 1792. Muir defended himself, 
using the occasion to restate his political convictions, arguing that he was defending 
the constitution and liberty rather than attacking them. He was convicted and 
sentenced to 14 years transportation – a sentence that was very heavy and surprised 
even many of those who supported the prosecution.13 This was followed by the trial of 
Thomas Fyshe Palmer at Perth in September 1793 on the charge of having written, 
printed and circulated a seditious writing – the text of an address to a meeting of the 
Friends of Liberty in Dundee. He was convicted and transported for seven years. The 
third group of cases then took place between January and March of 1794. These were 
four trials prosecuting members of the British Convention – William Skirving, 
Maurice Margarot, James Gerrard and Charles Sinclair. There was little surprise that 
all were convicted, and like Muir sentenced to 14 years transportation, not only 
because of the clear determination of the authorities to secure convictions in these 
cases, but also because they came in the wake of similar prosecutions (though for 
treason) of members of the British Convention in England.14 The attack on the British 
Convention in Scotland ended with the trial and execution of Robert Watt for high 
treason at the end of 1794. 
 
                                                 
13And out of step with the practice in England, where sedition was prosecuted as a misdemeanour. See  
M. Davis, “Prosecution and Radical Discourse during the 1790s: The case of the Scottish sedition 
trials” (2005) 33 Intnl. Jnl of the Soc. Of Law 148-58 at 154-5. See also WDL, “A Trial for Sedition” 
(1891) 35 Jnl. Of Jurisprudence 638. 




These trials were controversial for a number of reasons. Politically the trials have to 
be seen in the context of wider radical agitation in Britain in the wake of the French 
Revolution. There had by 1793 already been a number of trials for seditious libel in 
England – notably the conviction of Thomas Paine in 1792. The crime, along with 
high treason, was seen as one of the principal weapons in the fight against political 
crime – notwithstanding changes made by Fox’s Libel Act in 1792.15 The Scottish 
authorities were anxious about the spread of radicalism, which it has been suggested, 
may have been even more intense than in England.16 The use of sedition charges was 
thus normal in the wider context, but it was novel in Scotland, and the courts were 
accordingly determined to demonstrate both that it was legitimate and effective, and 
even that it could avoid some of the technical difficulties that were seen as hampering 
the application of the English law. However, the prosecution of sedition in the High 
Court as a crime at common law, and the exceedingly severe sentences brought the 
Scottish courts under scrutiny for their actions. In addition to these issues relating to 
the definition and extent of punishment for sedition which will be discussed below, 
criticism focused on the composition of the juries in the trials and on the conduct of 
the judges. 
 
Any trial before the High Court, either in Edinburgh or on circuit, was heard by a jury 
of fifteen. The procedure for the selection of the jury was that the sheriff clerk of the 
relevant counties would submit a list of 45 names from amongst eligible citizens who 
                                                 
15 32 Geo.III c.60 placing the decision on whether or not something was libellous in the hands  of the 
jury. 
16 EP Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth ,1968) p.13. See 
generally H. Meikle, Scotland and the French Revolution (1912); N. Leask, “Thomas Muir and The 




met the property qualification.17 Those 45 would be required to appear in court at the 
start of the trial, and the senior presiding judge, would select the fifteen, without 
challenge from the defence. The identity of the jurors was challenged by Thomas 
Muir, on the grounds that they were known to have previously accused him of being 
an enemy of the constitution, but this was rejected.18 The procedure was criticised by 
Cockburn on the grounds not only that it pre-determined the outcome of the trial, but 
that it encouraged factions, and was thus more divisive than having more balanced 
juries. However, his greatest criticisms were reserved for the judges conducting the 
trials on the grounds of their political reasoning and “confident assumption of the 
truth of the charges”.19 In this respect the character and conduct of Robert McQueen, 
Lord Justice-Clerk Braxfield, was singled out for the greatest criticism, for he was 
regarded as providing the intellectual force and setting the tone in the courtroom:  
“His blameableness (sic) in these trials far exceeds that of his brethren. They 
were weak; he was strong. They were frightened; he was not. They followed; 
he, the head of the court, led.”20 
Notwithstanding any of this, it is important to note that one of the most striking 
features to a reader of the trials is their legalism, making the reports into on often 
unlikely combination of political factionalism and legal analysis. The accused were 
legally represented, except where representation was refused, often by distinguished 
                                                 
17 See Hume, Commentaries p??. The procedure varied slightly for Edinburgh where 45 names would 
be submitted from each of the Lothians, and the clerk of court would reduce these to 45 who would be 
required to appear. See Cockburn, Examination pp.80-3. On the situation in England see Smith, op. cit. 
at fn 6 and generally J. Bentham, On the art of Jury Packing 
18 Get ref 
19 Cockburn, Examination p.88 
20 Examination p.87. On Braxfield’s character he said:  
“Braxfield was a profound practical lawyer, and a powerful man ; coarse and illiterate; of 
debauched habits, and of grosser talk than suited the taste even of his gross generation; utterly 
devoid of judicial decorum, and though pure in the administration of civil justice where he 
was exposed to no temptation, with no other conception of principle in any political case 




members of the bar, and as a result there was detailed legal argument over certain 
points.21 This suggests, as Emsley has commented, that there was, even on the part of 
the radicals, a general commitment to rule of law – even as they protested the 
particular conduct of these trials.22 
 
 
III. Making Sedition 
The trials of the 1790s introduced the crime of sedition into Scots law, but they did 
not establish the clear parameters of the crime. This was something that was done in 
mainly in subsequent doctrinal writings – treatises and cases. This also required that 
the crime be set within a narrative that could explain the harshness of the trials, as a 
necessity of a troubled period, while also demonstrating how the crime was 
unexceptional and necessary to the criminal law. There were three main issues that 
were looked at in this process: the scope and definition of the crime; the necessary 
mens rea; and the permitted punishment.  
 
i) Definition 
This process began in 1797 when the text that is regarded as the foundational text of 
modern Scots criminal law, Baron Hume’s Commentaries on the Law of Scotland 
Respecting Crimes, was published.23 Hume’s text was a conscious attempt to produce 
a systematic modern account of the criminal law, and to this end he systematically 
reviewed all decided cases and sources, presenting the law in a structure that self-
                                                 
21 cf England where unusual procedures Smith, Subverting p.??  
22 Emsley, Pitt’s Terror p.175. 





consciously mimicked that adopted by Blackstone’s Commentaries.24 There were, 
though, a couple of noteworthy features of the book. First, Hume was a died-in-the-
wool Tory who attracted criticism from some of the Edinburgh Review Whigs for his 
defence of the established order.25 This was nowhere starker than in relation to the 
crime of sedition. Cockburn, his best known critic, suggested in a review of the fourth 
edition that Hume had undertaken the work principally to vindicate Scots law in the 
face of its critics.26 This is unlikely, given its scale and the fact that Hume must have 
been working on it for a substantial period before 1797. However, Hume did 
acknowledge in the preface that the criminal law of Scotland was falling in the esteem 
of the public, and Cockburn was probably right in suggesting that one of the principal 
causes of this falling esteem was the overtly political use of the criminal law in the 
sedition trials. Second, Hume was keen to assert the independence of Scots criminal 
law, such that he took pains to point out the superior qualities of Scots law compared 
to its English equivalent – a feature which led to some interesting comparisons in the 
law of sedition.27 
 
It is clear that while Hume appears to have had few doubts that the law was properly 
used, he struggles to identify clear principles which might define the proper use of the 
law or distinguish the crime from related offences. Earlier texts, by writers such as Sir 
George Mackenzie, had mentioned the crime, but had largely treated it as a 
description of a class of crimes, rather than a separate crime in its own right, and had 
                                                 
24 On Hume see L. Farmer, “Scots Criminal Law” in M. Mulhern, A Compendium of Scottish 
Ethnology (Tuckwell Press, 2012) 
25 See e.g. Henry Cockburn’s review of the fourth edition of the Commentaries [get ref] 
26 Get ref 
27 On Hume and national identity see L. Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order 




linked it to the presence of actual unrest or insurrection.28 Hume, therefore, began by 
explaining why sedition amounted to a separate crime. Sedition, consisted in “stirring 
those foul and mutinous humours in the multitude, which, when once set afloat, may 
naturally issue in open violence and insurrection.”29 Thus, the crime was to be 
understood as:  
“reach(ing) all those practices, whether by deed, word, or writing, or of 
whatsoever kind which are suited and intended to disturb the tranquillity of the 
State, - for the purpose of producing public trouble or commotion, and moving 
his Majesty’s subjects to the dislike, resistance, or subversion, of the 
established government and laws, or settled frame and order of things.”30  
This is similar to English law in noting that the crime may be committed by deed, 
word or writing (mirroring libel, speech and conspiracy), but these are seen as 
different modes of committing a single crime, rather than distinct crimes. He goes on 
to list a number of examples, the common feature of which in his view was that they 
had been produced by the wickedness of the age (including teaching that monarchy 
and hereditary rank are contrary to reason and justice, or that the state is corrupt, or 
questioning the payment of taxes or septennial parliaments etc.). What these practices 
have in common, he suggests, is that they “exasperat[e] the multitude, and infect them 
with jealousy and dislike of the established order of the State, tend(ing) directly to a 
breach between sovereign and subject, and to fill the realm with trouble and 
                                                 
28 “Sedition is a Commotion of the people without Authority, and if it be such as tends to the disturbing 
of the Government … it is Treason; but if it only be raised  upon any privat [sic] Account, it is with us 
called a Convocation of the Liedges.” Mackenzie, On the Law and Customs of Scotland (1696) p??. 
Mackenzie drew heavily on Roman law, in which seditio referred to a kind of insurrection. 
29 Commentaries p.553 
30 Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes, i, 553. It is interesting to note that 
there is no substantial change in the text between the 1st and 4th editions, though Hume revised other 




dissension.”31 The essence of the crime then was seen in conduct which was suited or 
intended to disturb the relation between sovereign and subject thus lead to unrest. 
 
Sedition was also one of the crimes discussed at some length in Burnett’s Criminal 
Law, a treatise published in 1811.32 This text is of particular interest because its author 
acted for the Crown in several of the trials of the 1790s. It is less systematic in 
ambition than Hume, but contains a robust account of crimes against the state and a 
defence of the common law in repressing seditious unrest. For Burnett sedition 
consists in: 
“Whatever tends to unsettle the established order of Government, by 
producing discontent in the minds of the people; lessening the Sovereign in the 
estimation of his people; or in general, exciting a spirit of disloyalty to the 
King, and disaffection to the established Government, is Sedition, though 
there is no commotion, tumult, or rising of the people.”33 
This is then followed by a list of examples: reviling or scoffing at the King; 
declamations or invectives against monarchy in general or any branch of the 
legislature or any existing law or ordinance; or exhorting the people to resist or 
disobey the law; or seducing them from their duty and allegiance to the King. This is 
a much broader definition than that offered by Hume – anything which tends to 
produce discontent, disloyalty or disaffection, even if not aimed at a “total change or 
subversion of the existing system”.34 
 
                                                 
31 i, 554 






There is a marked change in tone by the time Archibald Alison’s Principles of 
Criminal Law was published 1832. Alison follows Hume and Burnett in describing 
sedition as being directed against the peace of the state, but his definition seeks to 
narrow the scope of the crime.35 Thus, 
“[A]ll language or publications are seditious which stimulate the subjects of 
the realm to attempt the alteration of the laws and existing institutions by 
violent and illegal methods, and not in the ordinary course prescribed by the 
constitution for their modification.”36 
This narrows the object of sedition – altering the existing laws and institutions rather 
than attacking the sovereign – and introducing the qualification that the crime did not 
consist in criticism as such, but the attainment of legitimate objects by violent or 
illegal means. His emphasis was also on conduct or writings which were aimed at 
altering the laws or constitution by these means. The importance of this was a 
narrowing of the kinds of conduct that amount to sedition, while introducing also a 
clearer focus on the necessary mens rea of the crime. This reflects an ambivalence 
towards the law in Alison who, while a staunch Tory, nonetheless expresses concern 
over the way that the law was used in the 1790s, in particular the harsh penalties.37 
Alison also stresses that that the nature of sedition might depend on the 
circumstances: to publish seditious writings in a time of turmoil would justifiably lead 
to prosecution. This allowed him both to narrow the scope of the crime, while arguing 
that the actions of the authorities in the 1790s were completely justified. It is 
interesting to note the analogy that he draws here to the crime of fire-raising – that 
                                                 
35 A. Alison, Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland (Wm. Blackwood: Edinburgh, 1832) p.580. 
He also follows Hobbes in stressing its potential to lead to civil war. 
36 p.581. My emphasis 
37 See pp.583-8 where he defends the imposition of severe penalties against Muir etc and the general 
principle that prosecuting sedition at common law was the correct approach in allowing punishment to 




just as a person who scattered burning firebrands could not escape liability for the 
resulting fire, so too a person who scattered words which caused unrest could not 
avoid liability for sedition.38 This is to be contrasted with analogy that was commonly 
drawn in the earlier cases between sedition and poison: the concern was not unrest as 
such but the  corrosive effects that the words would have on the social bond.39  
 
One of the major issues of definition for these writers was the difficulty in 
distinguishing the crime of sedition from other related crimes – notably treason, 
leasing-making, and mobbing and rioting.40 Mackenzie saw sedition as a species of 
either treason or riot. Hume describes sedition as “the parent and forerunner of 
treason”.41 This clearly marks the seriousness of the crime, while linking it to his 
earlier definition of acts which might break the bond of loyalty between sovereign and 
subject. And to reinforce this point he notes the existence of a number of Acts of the 
Scottish parliament (1584, 1661, 1681, 1685, 1690 and 1703) which declared certain 
kinds of seditious acts either to be treasons or to be punishable as treasons (though it 
is not always clear which). He also sought to distinguish the crime from leasing 
making, a term which is a Scots corruption of the phrase lese majeste, was a form of 
treason and included offences against the dignity of the sovereign or the uttering of 
lies or libels upon the personal character of the sovereign, his court, or his family. For 
Burnett leasing making was to be distinguished from sedition in that it was primarily a 
                                                 
38 See also Alison p.583. This reflects the changed concern that Smith points to with meetings which 
caused an immediate risk of public disorder, rather than seditious writings or speeches as such. See 
infra 
39 Get refs. 
40 This was believed to have important procedural consequences. Cockburn was of the view that if the 
facts alleged revealed treason then this had to be charged (Examination pp.??) and that this therefore 
should have been the charge in the British Convention cases. This was also the view taken by John 
Scott for the Crown in England, leading him to charge treason against Hardy, Tooke etc, where 
seditious libel might have been easier to establish. See FK Prochaska, “English State Trials in the 
1790s: A Case Study” (1973) 13 Jnl of Brit. Stud. 63-82 at 66-7. 




verbal injury or slander against the Prince and this might be committed without a 
seditious intention, though it must always have a seditious tendency – thus leasing 
making would always be sedition, but not vice versa.42 Sedition was distinguished 
from riot in that riot was considered to have only a local or private aim concerning a 
particular place or neighbourhood, whereas sedition was directed at the overthrow of 
the institutions of the state.43 Thus by the time of Alison it is clear that sedition is 
treated as the form of expression, and treason or riot were the potential outcomes. 
  
The modern definition of the crime is generally regarded as having been settled in the 
1848 case of James Cumming & Ors – the only reported case  in Scotland after 1820 
– which involved the prosecution of a group of Chartists for seditiously conspiring to 
alter the laws of the constitution by forming a group called the National Guard and 
making seditious speeches at a number of public meetings.44 The leading decision was 
given by Lord Justice-Clerk Hope who said: 
“The crime of sedition consists in wilfully, unlawfully, mischievously, and in 
violation of the party’s allegiance, and in breach of the peace, and to the public 
danger, uttering language calculated to produce popular disaffection, 
disloyalty, resistance to lawful authority, or, in more aggravated cases, 
violence and insurrection. The party must be made out not to be exercising his 
right of free discussion for legitimate objects, but to be purposely, 
mischievously, without regard to his allegiance, and to the public danger, 
                                                 
42 pp.249-50. see also Hume i, 559 
43 Hume, i, 558 




scattering burning firebrands, calculated to stimulate and excite such effects as 
I have mentioned – reckless of all consequences.”45 
While the object of sedition remains the same – uttering language calculated to 
produce public disaffection, disloyalty or violence and insurrection – there are a 
number of features of this definition that suggest how the law had changed. These are, 
first, the recognition of the right of free discussion for legitimate objects, such that it 
must be established by the Crown that the accused is not exercising this right. Second, 
there is the distinction between ordinary and aggravated cases, in the former where 
disaffection is produced, but in the latter where the language aims or is calculated to 
produce violence and insurrection. And third, there is more stress on intention, though 
as we shall see this need not be an intention to produce unrest, but merely to be 
intentionally uttering the language. It is also clear that the concern is less with the 
general stirring up of discontent than with the immediate tendency to produce public 
unrest, or to breach the peace, where the words are spoken.46 There was also by this 
stage a recognition that sedition might be more circumstantial – that is to say that it 
did not depend on the language used as such, but on the context, and that language or 
conduct which might be permissible under normal circumstances could become 
seditious in other conditions.47 
 
ii) Relation between actus reus and mens rea 
There were two important issues here. First, the kind of act that was required, and 
second whether or not there was a need to prove seditious intent (or merely that 
                                                 
45 At p.80. See also pp.85ff where he is explicitly critical of Hume’s definition. 
46 Cf Lobban, “From Seditious Libel” p.349. 
47 In Alison’s words, it would depend on the mode of bringing forward the measure, the means 
proposed to be adopted, and the temper of the times p.588. Cf English cases on audience: Vincent 
(1839) 9 C. & P. 91, 110; Collins (1839) 9 Car. & P. 456, 460. On the extent to which the particular 




something was seditious). The first question concerned whether it was necessary that 
there be actual unrest for sedition to have been completed. On this point Hume is 
clear, arguing that the material act in sedition is the speaking or publication of the 
words.48 In the case of verbal sedition an indictment would lie even though no tumult 
or violence takes place, because even a pamphlet or speech can disturb the tranquillity 
of the state. He thus argues that the printing or publishing of a discourse, or the 
holding of an assembly are already “a most material step or measure towards 
disturbing the tranquillity of the State.”49 
 
The second question proved to be more contentious, with the question of intention 
coming up in several of the cases in the 1790s, and being central to the Chartist case 
of 1848. The case of Berry & Robertson is a good example of how the question of 
intent arose in 1794. The prosecution was based on the fact that they had printed and 
published a seditious pamphlet, and it was argued on their behalf first that the 
pamphlet (or its author) had no seditious intent but was merely aimed at improving or 
reforming existing institutions. This was an argument that carried little weight.50 More 
importantly, it was suggested that as publishers only of a work in pamphlet form that 
had previously been published in a newspaper, they had no seditious intent – and that 
it was necessary for the Crown to establish this.51 They went on to argue that a 
publisher (as distinct from an author) might publish a work without reading it 
carefully and so would lack the necessary malus animus. The court, though, found the 
indictment relevant taking the view that printing and publishing a pamphlet provides 
                                                 
48 p.558 
49 P.558 
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prima facie evidence of the seditious intent of the printer. It was moreover held to be 
expedient that printers should be answerable for what they print unless they could 
show that their intentions were different. Hume, somewhat surprisingly, did not 
address the question of seditious intent, though in commenting on the case of Berry 
and Robertson he focused on the character of the writing and its seditious tendency, 
rather than any consideration of the malus animus or dole of the accused. 
 
The question of intention was not addressed at any length by any of the writers until 
the case of Cumming & Ors in 1848 where it was one of the central issues and 
allowed the court to create distance from the trials of the 1790s and from Hume in 
producing a more modern definition of the crime. The issue in the case concerned 
whether it was necessary for the Crown to show that the language used by the accused 
was intended to incite popular disaffection or was merely calculated to do so – or 
indeed if there was any difference between the two.52 Undertaking a systematic 
review of the authorities, Lord Justice-Clerk Hope addressed the question of the kind 
of intention that was required, coming to the conclusion that this was not a specific 
intention to produce particular results, but rather a general intention to utter or publish 
words that had a seditious quality. This he argued was no more than general dole or 
malice that was evidenced by the conduct itself. However, if intention or seditious 
purpose could be proven with reference to the precise effects that the words were 
calculated to produce, then this would amount to an aggravated form of sedition.53 
This he contrasted with treason which required a direct object or intent to bring about 
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insurrection. This is then illustrated with an example of an orator at a meeting, who he 
says would be clearly guilty of sedition. Here, Lord Hope argues that he might be 
egged on by a boisterous crowd, he might want to surpass the previous speakers, that 
he is so familiar with violent and dangerous language that he does not think how this 
would affect others: “he is reckless as to what he says; thinks or cares little about it…; 
but all the while he may not desire or intend the precise effects which his words are 
calculated to produce”.54 What is striking here is the clear separation of intention and 
act, but that he clearly sees guilt as resting in the power of language.55 
 
iii) Real and verbal sedition and the punishment of the crime  
One of the oddities of the legal discourse around sedition is the distinction drawn in 
most of the writers post-Mackenzie between real and verbal sedition. While this 
appears to be a narrow legal discussion of little practical significance, it in fact 
became closely related to discussion of the nature of the crime (whether statutory or 
common law), what had been charged in any given case, and the legal justification of 
punishment.  
 
There are two slightly different version of this distinction. Erskine, writing in 1781, 
saw it in terms of that between cases where no tumult and violence takes place 
(verbal) and those where it does (real).56 That is to say that real sedition is manifested 
in action. Alison suggested a slightly modified version of this, arguing that every 
subject has a right to argue that the power of certain institutions has become 
overgrown, but that this becomes sedition if he then goes on to argue that power 
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should be retrenched by illegal means.57 He then goes on to follow Erskine, seeing 
this as verbal sedition, with real sedition bearing a close resemblance to riot.58 Hume 
draws the distinction in a different way, seeing it in terms of “the nature and substance 
of the thing itself that is done”.59 Verbal sedition is the expression of inflammatory 
sentiments without directly proposing any action; while real sedition involves the 
recommending of a course of action (e.g. recommending a course of measures for 
accomplishing change or reformation of the state).60  
 
The point generally arose in cases where there was dispute over the crime that was 
charged and the permissible extent of punishment. There were many statutory 
offences which had been created in times of unrest, which either criminalised conduct 
overlapping with sedition, or upgraded its punishment for sedition. As examples of 
the first, consider the Act of 1685 making it treason to take or defend the Solemn 
League and Convenant, the Unlawful Oaths Acts 1797 and 1812, the Seditious 
Meetings Act 1817 and so on. These were charged indiscriminately in Scotland, As 
examples of the second were the statutes mentioned above which raised sedition to 
treason. The penalties for sedition, though, were reduced by statute 1825 which 
removed transportation as penalty and purported to make the punishment of the crime 
the same in both Scotland and England.61 The existence and status of these statutes 
gave rise to considerable confusion and debate in the cases of the 1790s, but since the 
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use of the common law crime gave unlimited powers of punishment, short of death, 
the Court was generally able to avoid problems. 
 
The existence of these created a great deal of uncertainty around the legal status of 
particular charges which defence counsel sought to exploit. In Sinclair and Gerald, 
the defence had sought to argue that verbal sedition was like leasing-making only 
punishable under the Act 1703 c.4 by fine, imprisonment or banishment (i.e. exile 
from Scotland).62 This was linked to a more general claim that sedition was not a 
crime at common law, and thus that its punishment would depend on the libelling of 
particular statutory powers to punish. Both points were, as might have been expected, 
dismissed by the Court. It was held that verbal sedition differed from leasing making 
in that the latter was narrower (verbal injury or slander against the person of the 
King). They also held that if sedition was a crime at common law then it might be 
punished by arbitrary pains as the court held an inherent jurisdiction to punish crimes 
at common law.63 Hume later gave a further gloss on this arguing that the crime 
would exist at common law in any system of established government as it arises 
necessarily out of the existence of the institution of regular government “without the 
aid of any positive act or declaration of the legislature”.64 However by following the 
Court in the view that sedition was common law in origin Hume also lines up against 
those such as Mackenzie and Erskine who had linked the origins of the crime to 
Roman law thus asserting the national origins of Scots law. Hume then uses this to 
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reinforce the new orthodoxy of the common law origins of Scots criminal law and of 




In summary, what we see in these discussions of the legal definition of sedition is the 
replication of a general trend that can be observed in most common law jurisdictions 
which is the initial definition and then a gradual ‘domestication’ of the crime, 
attempting to make it more suitable to the changing political situation. This is perhaps 
more marked in Scotland because of the novelty of the charge in the 1790s. First of all 
there is the attempt to mark out the distinct territory for the crime. This distinguishes 
it from treason. It is not only aimed against the person of the King, but at all 
institutions of government; and where  the law of treason struggled with the 
requirement for an overt act, this could be found more readily in sedition where the 
act was the speech, writing or publication, which was easily proved and the focus was 
accordingly on the tendency of the language to produce disruption. However, this 
analogy with treason permitted  the imposition of severe sentences, whereas in 
England seditious libel was prosecuted as a misdemeanour. Second, after this period 
of establishing the crime, its scope was narrowed to include forms of legitimate 
protest or attempts to secure reform through legitimate means, or through the 
identification of a more clearly defined mental element. This process, though, was 
conducted in way which sought to bring the trials of the 1790s and the writers who 
justified these crimes within a broader narrative of constitutional progress. 
 
                                                 





III. Sedition and Political Crimes.  
According to Lord Cockburn there were only 23 trials for sedition in Scotland 
between 1703 and 1848.66 After the trials between 1798 and 1802 of various members 
of the United Scotsmen, which again led to several lengthy sentences for 
transportation, there was a marked change of tone in the conduct of the trials.67 
Statements from the bench were more temperate, sentences were significantly shorter, 
and there was even the rare occurrence of an acquittal.68  For Cockburn the conduct of 
sedition trials was a touchstone of the courts  and their ability to remain above 
political conflict – a challenge that they signally failed in the 1790s. The problem was 
less the existence of the crime than the susceptibility of the courts to political 
pressure.69 This became the settled position in Scots law by the mid-nineteenth 
century as sedition continued to be treated as a crime of central importance to the 
criminal law. In this final section then I want to look more broadly at the history of 
crimes against the state, and how this broad category changed over the modern period, 
so as to draw some broader conclusions about the history of sedition. 
 
In order to address this question it is first necessary to look at the changing uses of the 
crime. It is now generally accepted that the law of sedition worked on the “principle 
of suspended terror”.70 The law was broad in its terms and capable of catching many 
within its net. Throughout the eighteenth century it was used in England against the 
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publishers of radical texts, or against those who spoke at small political meetings, 
with prosecutions based on the evidence of spies and informers. Problems began to 
arise both for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the law when forms of political 
expression and participation began to change, particularly in the wake of the French 
revolution. Most notable here was the growth of  ‘mass platform’ meetings, where the 
concern for the authorities became that of controlling public order at the meeting 
itself. As Lobban has shown, this was addressed in two ways.71 First, in the wake of 
the massacre at Peterloo, where the army had charged at and killed protestors, there 
was a move to using professional police. And in the criminal law there was a shift 
from using the law of sedition, towards addressing the public order dimensions of the 
protest itself. Prosecuting for unlawful assembly brought the legal focus on to the 
lawfulness of the protest rather than the words, motives or political objectives of the 
speakers. As Smith has argued, “this registered a shift from denial of the legal and 
political legitimacy of public censure of Establishment institutions and advocacy of 
political alternatives, to a position where the prosecutorial focus became challenging 
the means by which such political attacks might be lawfully manifested.”72 The crime 
of sedition was thus redefined to focus less on the broader political objectives of the 
speaker, than on the tendency of the language to produce public disorder. The effect 
of this in the criminal law was to entrench the modern separation between crimes 
against the state and crimes against public order. These were increasingly seen as 
conceptually distinct.73 The category of crimes against the state was as a result made 
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more specific. A good index of this change is Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s analysis 
of this category in terms of treason, unlawful assemblies and riots, the unlawful 
possession of explosive substances and offensive weapons, and seditious offences.74  
 
We should finally note the conception of the state that were underlay the justifications 
of sedition. For Hume, as for Hobbes, sedition could readily be understood as a kind 
of sickness and the aim of the law was to protect the settled order of things. This view 
of sedition was based on an understanding of the state as a kind of personal bond of 
allegiance between sovereign and subject. But this was not based on an understanding 
of the subject possessing any kind of agency; they were rather supposed to trust in the 
sovereign and their representatives in government. This is clear in his sense of the 
people. For Hume the multitude or the people represented a potential threat, but 
lacked agency. Something was done to them by seditious language which stirred them 
up into unrest. Responsibility did not lie with the people to resist this, but rather with 
those political actors, who were assumed to come from a different class to moderate 
their language or to act responsibly at times of unrest so as not to disturb political 
order – or in the later conception of the crime, to channel their energies into legitimate 
(and permitted) forms of political action.75 What this suggests is not merely that the 
crime of sedition is inconsistent with democracy, but more that it is so deeply tied up 
with this model of political order and fear of the dangers of language, that it is hard to 
see how it could be consistent with more modern understandings of the state. 
                                                                                                                                            
disloyalty (Fighting Words para 2.36, though th law was amended in 1986 to include common law 
requirement of intention to create violence, public disturbance or disorder). Then revived and restated 
in 2005 to be consistent with counter-terrorism (see 2.46-9). The new offences though are specific in 
content – inciting political violence – and the ALRC accordingly recommended that the term sedition 
no longer be used as inappropriate. 
74 See General View. Subsequently reproduced in his draft code and the Canadian Criminal Code of 
1892. 
75 It is interesting to note that Burnett suggests that resistance, including inflammatory libels or secret 
societies, is permissible but only in times of “real oppression” (p.261) 
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